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found that the city had no earlier notice of Hoelzer's
intent to keep the murals. Consequently, there was
no issue of 'nreasonable delay" by the city in
attempting to recover the paintings since the "un-
reasonable delay" issue was removed from this
context in Guggenheim v. Lubell.5
In evaluating the requirements set forth in
DeWeerth and Guggenheim, the court concluded
that New York law imposes no such duty of due
diligence on owners of lost or stolen art for statute
of limitations purposes.6 The court rendered this
conclusion in the event that the judiciary may en-
counter a dispute between a good faith possessor
and a theft victim. This approach, noted the court,
serves to balance the equities in these types of
situations, including the reasonableness of the ef-
forts of the theft victim made to locate property, and
the reasonableness of the possessor's grounds for
believing that he is entitled to the property.
The court next addressed Hoelzer's abandonment
of property claim, stressing that proof of actual
abandonment turns on intent. The court defied
that such intent be demonstrated by a virtual
throwing away of the property, and cannot simply
be presumed. The court concluded that the letter
sent by the Stamford superintendent to the Board
of Education requesting that the murals be stored
properly during the school's renovation clearly
proved that the school district did not intend for the
murals to be thrown away.
Conclusion
The court concluded that the city's claim was
barred neither by the statute of limitations nor by
the doctrine of abandonment. Therefore, the mu-
rals remain public property. Hoelzer, the court
added, remains free to seek compensation for his
restoration work on the art. 0?
Kirsten Benner-Mulvihill
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Introduction
Eduoard MacAvoy, plaintiff, brought this action
against the Smithsonian Institution (the "Smith-
sonian") for recovery of artwork created by the
artist Romaine Brooks claiming possession of the
artwork through a French Act of Sale.1 The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted a Motion to Dismiss and Summary Judg-
ment for the Smithsonian, holding: (1) the artist's
transfer of her artwork to the museum did not
create a bailment; (2) the plaintiff's replevin claim
is subject to the strictures of the Federal Tort Claim
Act;2 and (3) the plaintiff failed to state a claim for
a fifth amendment taking and a violation of due
process.
Facts
This case concerns the rightful possession of pieces
of artwork by the late artist Romaine Brooks. The
pieces of artwork in dispute are currently held by
the Smithsonian. The plaintiff claims possession of
these pieces through an Act of Sale issued in France
on April 27, 1966.3 Under various theories, 4 the
plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and nomi-
nal damage relief.
Prior to her death, Ms. Brooks executed an Act of
Sale that allegedly conveyed to the plaintiff her two
Nice apartments and the "meubles meublants" con-
tained therein. Attached to this Act of Sale was a
list of eleven paintings and their prices. Ten of these
paintings are now held by the Smithsonian. The Act
of Sale also included a clause stating that Ms.
Brooks had the right to use and enjoy her apart-
ment and its contents until her death.
During the time between the execution of the Act of
Sale and Ms. Brooks' death on December 17, 1970,
Ms. Brooks regularly corresponded with the Smith-
sonian regarding her artwork and its exhibit. On
several occasions, the Chief Curator of the museum
and other representatives visited Ms. Brooks in
France and Italy. They spoke with Ms. Brooks
about selected pieces which she would give to the
museum. Following the discussions, Ms. Brooks
sent numerous shipments of her work to the Smith-
sonian. Each shipment was followed by a letter of
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receipt and a thank you to Ms. Brooks for her gifts
to the museum. In June of 1983, the plaintiff wrote
to the Smithsonian claiming to be the owner of
eleven pieces of Ms. Brooks' artwork in the Smitho-
nian's possession. Both the museum and its attor-
ney sent letters in July and September of 1983,
respectively, to the plaintiff informing him that the
artist's work had been given to the museum as gifts
by the artist before her death.
Legal Analysis
The plaintiff alleged in his first theory that a con-
tract or contracts for bailment were expressly or
impliedly created between Ms. Brooks and the
Smithsonian; therefore, as successor-in-interest
upon Ms. Brooks' death, he was entitled to the
possession of the artwork held by the Smithsonian.
The court disagreed with this characterization of
the transactions by the plaintiff.
Because bailments are defined by state law, the
court was compelled to analyze the bailment theory
under the law of the District of Columbia. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held that
the subject matter of a bailment requires a delivery
by a bailor and acceptance from a bailee.5 The bailee
does not acquire title but holds the property for the
term of the bailment. Bailment is a form of contract
and requires mutual assent on the part of both
parties. If there is no express agreement, an im-
plied in fact bailment can be found if mutual assent
by both parties can be ascertained from the circum-
stances.
6
Through testimony of two Smithsonian repre-
sentatives and the documentary evidence of the
museum's correspondence with Ms. Brooks ac-
knowledging her "gifts", the court found there was
no assent on the part of the Smithsonian for any
type of bailment arrangement. Although Ms.
Brooks is deceased and it is difficult to determine
her subjective intent, the court concluded that she
too did not consent to a bailment arrangement
when she did not respond to the contrary to the
Smithsonian's letters thanking her for her gifts.
Moreover, when the artwork was shipped from
France the documents reflected a permanent,
rather than a temporary, export shipment of art-
work. Therefore, since the court found no mutual
assent between Ms. Brooks and the Smithsonian to
consider the artwork as bailments, they granted
summary judgement on these counts to the Smith-
sonian.
Plaintiffs second theory rested on a claim of re-
plevin. The plaintiff alleged he was the rightful
owner of Ms. Brooks' artwork and the Smith-
sonian's refusal to return the work was a wrongful
detainment of his personal property. Replevin is a
remedy to recover the possession of one's property
wrongfully detained by another.7 The District Court
for the District of Columbia has held that an action
for replevin sounds in tort,8 and therefore has held
that a plaintiffs replevin claim is an action in tort.
The Smithsonian is part of the United States gov-
ernment.9 Tort claims against the United States are
governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act
('FTCA"). 10 Suits brought against the United
States are brought only with its consent and under
the strictures of terms and conditions imposed by
statute. The FTCA specifically sets out prereq-
uisites to filing a tort claim. The first prerequisite
is jurisdictional in that an action cannot be main-
tained in district court unless an administrative
claim was filed within the two year statute of limi-
tations." The claim accrues from the time the
claimant discovers, or should have discovered with
due diligence, his injury and the cause of that
injury.12 If the administrative claim is not brought
within the two year statute of limitations, it is
forever barred.
13
The Smithsonian's letters to the plaintiff in July
and September of 1983 refusing to return the paint-
ings and claiming ownership provided the plaintiff
with notice. Yet, despite this notice, the plaintiff
waited six years, until 1989, to file his claim. There-
fore, since the court held that the plaintiffs re-
plevin claim was a tort action, and the plaintiff
failed to file an administrative claim within two
years, the court dismissed this count for lack of
jurisdiction.
Likewise, the plaintiffs failure to take advantage
of relief under the FTCA precluded him from stat-
ing a fifth amendment due process claim for either
damages or injunctive relief. The plaintiff relied on
the Bivens doctrine 4 for money damages. In dis-
missing the plaintiffs due process damage claims,
the court found that his reliance on the Bivens
doctrine was misplaced for two reasons: first, he
had not sued the museum officials in their individ-
ual capacities; and second, Bivens does not allow
damage actions based on constitutional claims
against the federal government.
On the question of injunctive relief, which is not
precluded byBivens, the court found that the plain-
tiff was required to prove that he was deprived of
his property not merely by insufficient or inade-
quate procedures, but by constitutionally inade-
quate procedures. The procedures must contain a
defect so grave that they can be characterized as
fundamentally unfair and so basic as to result in a
deprivation of due process.' 5 The court found in this
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